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ARTICLES
CONFLICTS PROBLEMS WHEN REPRESENTING
MEMBERS OF CORPORATE FAMILIES
Ronald D. Rotunda*
I. INTRODUCIION
The last two decades have witnessed an increasing number of
mergers, spin-offs, purchases and sales of corporations and parts of
corporations. All this activity has resulted in corporate families with
ever-changing members. The corporate subsidiary of one corporation
on any given day may be a member of a different corporate family on
the next day. To this complex mixture we must add another ingredi-
ent: law firms themselves are increasingly subject to mergers. The
newly created firm may find that it is now representing a corporate
client in one matter that is adverse to the interests of another corpora-
tion, and, while that other corporation is not a client, it is the parent
or subsidiary or sister corporation of a client.
Under the law of corporations, each of the incorporeal beings of
a corporate family is typically treated as a separate entity-unless the
corporate veil is pierced. Piercing is unusual; it is the exception, not
the rule.' In contrast, under the law of ethics and attorney conflict of
interests, courts often assume that piercing the corporate veil is the
* The Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of
Law. I am grateful to Robert E. O'Malley, Esq. for our helpful discussions of these
issues, as well as Carlos Ball and William Freivogel. Needless to say, I remain
responsible for my conclusions as well as any errors in this paper (although I would be
happy to share the blame). This article is based on remarks originally presented at
the Hofstra University Conference, Legal Ethics: The Core Issues, on March 10-12, 1996.
1 See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966); see also WALTON H.
HAMILTON, ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE CORPORATE VEIL (1946); STEPHEN B. PRESSER,
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (1991); Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49
TEX. L. REv. 979 (1971); cf. Harry D. Krause, The Multi-Corporate International Business
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act-Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Revisited, 17 Bus. LAw. 912
(1962).
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rule and not the exception. Attorneys have increasingly found them-
selves charged with unintended conflicts of interest when the law firm
represents a client that becomes a member of a different corporate
family.
Should separate corporations that are affiliated with each other
be treated as the same entity when a court is deciding whether to dis-
qualify a law firm? Or should courts treat the corporate veil as some-
thing that is not easily pierced?
Consider, first, a simple case. Assume that a lawyer (Lawyer) rep-
resents a client called Corporation Alpha. Lawyer has never repre-
sented another corporation, called Corporation Beta. May Lawyer
represent Corporation Alpha, in the case of Alpha v. Defendant, while
simultaneously representing another client suing Corporation Beta in
a completely unrelated case, the case of Plaintiff v. Beta? Given these
facts, the normal rules of ethics would find no conflict. The answer is,
in fact, obvious. Lawyer would be violating no ethics rules, would not
be subject to discipline, and the judge in either the Alpha or Beta case
would find no reason to disqualify Lawyer.
Now, we shall add one more fact: Corporation Beta is the parent
or subsidiary of Corporation Alpha. Or, Beta and Alpha are sister cor-
porations-that is, they are separate corporate entities each owned by
a third corporation. The question, more precisely restated, is whether
a lawyer may represent a corporation in one matter while undertaking
representation adverse to an affiliate of that corporation in a differ-
ent, unrelated matter. The cases or representations still have no rela-
tion to each other; that is, there is no confidential information that
the law firm learned from Corporation Alpha that would be relevant
in representing Plaintiff in the case of Plaintiff v. Beta. The law firm
does not acquire, by its representation of Corporation Alpha, any im-
proper advantage in representing Plaintiff against Corporation Beta.
If, in fact, Corporation Alpha were not affiliated with Corporation
Beta, there would be no conflict of interest.
All of these references to Greek letters may remind lawyers too
much of high school algebra, so permit me to substitute a more con-
crete example. Assume that a law firm does some title work for Taco
Bell, as it opens a few more restaurants. The same firm also decides to
represent plaintiff, who is suing Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), be-
cause a KFC delivery truck ran into the plaintiff's car. Taco Bell and
KFC are each separate corporations, so normally, there would be no
ethical question involved. However, both are now owned by Pepsico.
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Does that fact create a per se conflict of interests for the lawyer?2
Should large parent corporations that create separately-incorporated
subsidiaries be able to treat themselves as separate corporations when
it suits their purposes while still being able to treat themselves as a
single entity for strategic purposes, that is, for purposes of disqualify-
ing opposing counsel?
We should assume that the law firm, while representing Taco
Bell, acquired no confidential information that would be at all rele-
vant in the tort action involving the KFC truck. Given the facts of this
case, that assumption is certainly a reasonable one to make. Let us
also assume that Taco Bell, KFC and Pepsico are run as separate cor-
porations, and that it cannot be said that one corporation is the alter
ego of any of the others.
KFC and Taco Bell are both wholly-owned subsidiaries of Pepsico.
To some commentators, it is of great moment whether the subsidiar-
ies are wholly owned or only partially owned.3 To these people it ap-
pears that there would be a per se conflict of interest if the parent
wholly owns the two subsidiaries, but no such conflict if the parent
owned ninety-nine and forty-four one-hundredths percent of the two
subsidiaries. I find it unusually formalistic-reminiscent of nine-
teenth-century jurisprudence 4-to conclude that the existence of a
per se conflict automatically disappears if the parent owns an amount
2 While corporations are members of the same corporate family, they treat them-
selves (and corporate law treats them) as separate entities. For example, Pizza Hut
and Taco Bell decided to withdraw from advertising the Dana Carvey television show,
because some of Carvey's humor was thought to be offensive. However, Pepsi-Cola
stayed on as a sponsor. "We're all autonomous divisions that make independent deci-
sions," said Pepsi spokesman Jon Harris. Taco Bell Pulls Ads from Dana Carvey Show,
CHAMPAIGN-URBANA NEws-GAzETFE, Mar. 15, 1996, at C1.
Sometimes corporations are part of the same corporate family, even though they
both are listed in the stock exchange. The stock market treats the corporations (e.g,
General Motors and Electronic Data Systems Corporation) as different entities.
When General Motors decided to spin-off its Electronic Data Systems unit, there were
significant negotiations between the two companies as to the amount of a one-time
dividend from EDS to GM. The stock market, as well as EDS and GM, treated the two
corporations as separate entities. Gabriella Stem & Neal Templin, GM, EDS Unit Are
in Accord About Payout, WALL ST.J., Oct. 9, 1995, at A3. The market even awarded GM
and EDS different price/earnings ratios.
3 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 390 (1995)
(Lawrence J. Fox dissenting).
4 See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 4 (1976).
Justice Holmes often attacked the practitioners of formalistic jurisprudence. See LiVA
BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HmL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES (1991); SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WEN-
DELL HOLMES (1989).
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less than one hundred percent of the subsidiary. I will argue that
there is no per se conflict even if two subsidiaries are wholly owned by
a third corporation. But, in those specific cases where courts should
find a conflict5 -if, in short, there is a conflict-it should not disap-
pear simply because the parent has sold a fraction of one of its subsidi-
aries to a third party.
One might think that the law firm representing a plaintiff against
KFC might pull its punches in that lawsuit (in the hope of currying
favor with Pepsico and thereby securing more business), so we should
also assume that the law firm tells the tort plaintiff of its relationship
with Taco Bell and also advises the tort plaintiff that it believes6 that it
will vigorously sue KFC notwithstanding the fact that KFC is a sister
corporation of Taco Bell. The tort plaintiff, after learning these facts,
consents to his continued representation by the law firm. In other
words, he decides to stay with the law firm, does not hire another law-
yer, authorizes the lawsuit and waives any right that he may have to
object to any alleged conflict involving his lawyer. But what about
KFC? Must the law firm also secure consent from KFC, its adversary in
the litigation? Does KFC have the right to object to plaintiff hiring a
law firm that does work for Taco Bell, if both Taco Bell and KFC are
owned by Pepsico? Does Pepsico also have a right to insist on the
disqualification of the law firm?
My hypothetical case is just that: hypothetical. I have in mind no
specific case involving Pepsico. But the fact pattern I have described
is hardly hypothetical. It happens every day, has spawned a great deal
of conflicts of interest litigation, and sometimes results in the disquali-
fication of the law firm.7
Consider Stratagem Development Corp. v. Heron International N. V,8 a
federal court decision that answered the question I have posed. Strata-
gem found a per se conflict. Interpreting New York law, it ruled that a
lawyer cannot sue a present client and therefore cannot sue a subsidi-
5 See infra text accompanying notes 93-102.
6 Its belief must be reasonable and in good faith. MODEL RuLs OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1) (1995); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 cmt. c(iv) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); 1 GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.7:206, :301 (2d ed. 1990); RONALD E.
MALLEN &JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 12.10 (3d ed. 1989).
If the law firm were representing a tort plaintiff suing KFC, a present client, the
conflict would be governed by Model Rule 1.7(a) and the lawyer would have to secure
the consent of each of its present clients, the tort plaintiff, and KFC. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1995).
7 See infra text accompanying notes 10-11.
8 756 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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ary or affiliate of a present client. The court broadly announced that
the duty with regard to suing a present client "applies with equal force
where the client is a subsidiary of the entity to be sued."9
In Stratagem, the law firm represented the plaintiff, who claimed
an alleged breach of a joint venture agreement to develop certain
properties. During this same period the law firm also represented
FSC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant, in an unrelated law-
suit. The court found that FSC was a present client of the law firm
when it was investigating and drafting the complaint against FSC's par-
ent company.10 Therefore, the court disqualified the law firm using a
test that was sweepingly broad in its implication: a lawyer cannot take
a case adverse to the interests of a corporation affiliated with a law
firm's client because the "liabilities of a subsidiary corporation affect
the bottom line of the corporate parent."1' Nor can the law firm avoid
the problem by dropping the disfavored client: the law firm "may not
undertake to represent two potentially adverse clients and then, when
the potential conflict becomes actuality, pick and choose between
them."12
At first glance, the fact situation posed in Stratagem may appear to
be unusually narrow, arcane, or esoteric. Indeed, one must under-
stand several other important rules of ethics before even approaching
the Stratagem issue.13 Yet the practical consequences of the Stratagem
rule are far from obscure. Nor is Stratagem alone in the case law. A
significant number of cases appear to adopt the principle that a law
firm may not represent a party adverse to a corporate affiliate of a
client, without consent of all parties (including the parent corpora-
tion which has no involvement in the lawsuit) even though the mat-
ters are completely unrelated and one of the parties is the adverse
party in litigation (who is therefore unlikely to give consent).14
9 Id. at 792.
10 Id. at 793.
11 Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 794.
13 See infra Part II.
14 See, e.g., Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Anixter Bros., No. C-1-93-0871, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21012 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 1994) (The trial judge, in an unusually broad rul-
ing, disqualified a law firm because he concluded that litigation against Anixter could
affect the financial well-being of Anixter's parent, Itel, and therefore could indirectly
affect the financial bottom line of the parent; the law firm was disqualified because it
also represented a subsidiary of Itel in unrelated transactional work.); Gould, Inc. v.
Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Telesat Cablevi-
sion, Inc. v. Opryland USA, Inc., No. 90-137-CIV-ORL-19, 1990 WL 303150 (M.D. Fla.
July 25, 1990).
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The Stratagem test-whether the "liabilities of a subsidiary corpo-
ration affect the bottom line of the corporate parent ' 15 -has enor-
mous implications. A law firm could have trouble suing a corporation
(such as General Motors) if any one of the law firm's clients owned
any stock in General Motors because the liabilities (and even the po-
tential liabilities) of General Motors affect its bottom line.
If a law firm represents clients who used electricity or water (i.e.
any client), then it could not also represent an electrical or water util-
ity in the same geographic area urging a rate increase because an in-
crease in electrical or water rates will adversely "affect the bottom line"
of the other clients. Indeed, Stratagem argued that if a law firm repre-
sented a trade association, it could not represent any other client in
an unrelated lawsuit brought against any member of the trade associa-
Other cases that reject a rigid approach include the oft-cited Pennwalt Corp. v.
Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264 (D. Del. 1980). See infra text accompanying note 95.
Pennwalt emphasized that the legal departments of the affiliated corporations were
not integrated and the law firm found itself in the situation where one corporation
acquired another. The alleged conflict was thrust upon the law firm. See also, e.g.,
Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Sprint Publ'g & Adver., Inc., No. 95-C-5825, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2363 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 1996) (denying disqualification in corporate fam-
ily situation in which a law firm represented United Telephone in a tax matter in
Ohio, while simultaneously filing an unrelated lawsuit in Illinois against United Tele-
phone's sister corporation, Sprint Publishing and Advertising); Apex Oil Co. v. Wick-
land Oil Co., No. CIV-S-94-1499-DFL-GGH, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6398 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
28, 1995) (holding that a parent and subsidiary corporation would be treated as the
same entity for conflicts of interest purposes only if the two entities were, in fact, true
alter egos); In re Wingspread Corp., 152 B.R 861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); Teradyne,
Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C-91-0344-MHP-ENE, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8363
(N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991); G.F. Indus., Inc. v. American Brands, Inc., 583 A.2d 765
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (concluding that the parent and subsidiary were sepa-
rate entities for conflicts purposes).
Cf Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1977). In Whiting,
a lawyer represented Plaintiff in case against Defendant, while also representing, on
unrelated matters, Corporation (which owns 20 percent of Defendant and had the
power to appoint 40 percent of the Board of Directors). Plaintiff consented, but Cor-
poration and Defendant did not; however, the lawyer agreed not to represent Corpo-
ration during the pendency of the case. The trial court refused to disqualify the
lawyer and the court of appeals found no abuse of discretion. In City Council v. Sakai,
570 P.2d 565 (Haw. 1977), the court ruled that a lawyer may represent the city on
bond matters while simultaneously suing the city (on behalf of a client) on unrelated
matters. See also Vanderveer Group, Inc. v. Petruny, No. CIVA.93-3677, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13614 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1993); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR
Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y 1989).




tion.16 Should it be the law that if a firm represents the American Bar
Association it can never represent a client injured in a car driven by a
member of the ABA? And if that is the rule, what interests does it
protect, and what do those interests have to do with ethics?
In order to analyze the sister corporation issue, we must first lay
some preliminary groundwork and briefly look at the basic ethical
rules that are not in dispute. Then, with this foundation in place, we
will apply those rules to analyze an issue that is very much in dispute.
II. THE ETHICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SISTER CORPORATION ISSUE
A. Simultaneous Representation
To place the issue of sister corporations in proper perspective, we
should first consider the disqualification rules governing simultane-
ous representation of adverse interests. Consider the situation where
a law firm (Law Firm) represents a corporation (Corporation A) in
various matters involving a particular issue, for example, labor law ad-
vice. Other members of the Law Firm represent other clients (Corpo-
rations X, Y, and Z) on matters that have no relation' 7 to the labor
law matters; for example, the Law Firm may represent Corporations X
Y, and Zin connection with a patent infringement lawsuit that Corpo-
ration A has filed against Corporations X Y, and Z.
A basic ethics rule states that Law Firm may not represent Corpo-
rations X Y, and Z in this patent lawsuit against the interests of Corpo-
ration A, even though Corporation A is represented by its own counsel
(who is separate from Law Firm) and even though the two representa-
16 Id. (citing Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd on other grounds, 653 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981)).
To be distinguished is the case where disqualification is necessary to protect con-
fidential information. Thus, when the law firm for the trade association promised its
individual members that it would treat information from them as protected by the
attorney-client privilege, and then-on the strength of that promise-did obtain that
confidential information, which was material to a substantially related case that the
law firm then brought against several members of the trade association, the law firm
should be disqualified in order to protect confidences. Westinghouse Elec. Co. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319-21 (7th Cir. 1978). The Seventh Circuit
stated: "Gulf, Kerr-McGee and Getty each entertained a reasonable belief that it was
submitting confidential information regarding its involvement in the uranium industry
to a law firm which had solicited the information upon a representation that the firm
was acting in the undivided interest of each company." Id. at 1321 (emphasis added).
17 The cases or representations have no relation to each other in the sense that
there is no confidential information that the Law Firm learned from Corporation A
that would be relevant in representing Corporations X Y, or Z adversely to Corpora-
tion A. In other words, Law Firm (because it is simultaneously representing Corpora-
tion A) gains no improper advantage in representing Corporations X, Y, or Z
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tions have no relation to each other. In other words, a lawyer may not
sue a present client during the course of a representation. The cause
of the conflict is not a breach of the duty of confidentiality (for there
are no relevant confidences to violate) but rather a breach of the duty
of loyalty to a present client.18
Several policy reasons support this duty of loyalty. For example,
Corporations X, Y, and Z, which are also clients of the Law Finn, may
be concerned that the Law Firm, in suing Corporation A, might pull
some punches in the dispute against Corporation A because it antici-
pates (or hopes for) further business from Corporation A, its present
client.
If that were the only reason, Corporations X, Y', and Z could elimi-
nate the conflict by waiving it. However, their waiver is not sufficient
because Corporation A is also hurt. The Law Firm is an agent of its
principal, Corporation A. The law of agency requires the agent to be
loyal to the principal.' 9 To sue a present client violates this duty of
loyalty. Thus the leading case of Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc.20 held
that "[a] lawyer's duty to his client is that of fiduciary or trustee,"2
and that the client is "entitled to feel that at least until that litigation
was at an end, it had his undivided loyalty as its advocate and cham-
pion."22 Each client is owed the same fiduciary duty of "undivided
allegiance and faithful, devoted service."
23
18 See, e.g., IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); City of Little Rock v. Cash,
644 S.W.2d 229 (Ark. 1982); Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964).
See generally Robert C. Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda, Standing, Waiver, Laches, and
Appealability in Attorney Disqualification Cases, 3 CORP. L. REv. 82 (1980).
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 209 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1991).
20 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
21 Id. at 1386.
22 Id.
23 Id. So strong is this policy, that courts have often said that this type of con-
flict-suing a present client-is not waiverable. See, e.g., In re Kelly v. Greason, 244
N.E.2d 456, 459-62 (N.Y. 1969). The rule is an old one. See ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 112 (1934). But see MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 8 (1995):
However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate
against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with di-
verse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enter-
prise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's
relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients con-
sent upon consultation.... The propriety of concurrent representation can
depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud





The duty to refrain from taking a case adverse to Corporation A
only applies while Corporation A is a client of the law firm. There is
no general rule prohibiting a client from suing aformer client. Other-
wise any corporation, particularly a large one such as General Electric
or General Motors, would be able to preclude many lawyers from ever
taking positions adverse to them just because, years before, someone
in the law firm had represented them. There is, in short, no duty of
loyalty to a former client.
However clients are entitled to have lawyers forever hold in confi-
dence "information relating to the representation. ' 24 That is why, sub-
ject to various exceptions,2 5 the "duty of confidentiality continues
after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated."26 Thus a law firm
cannot take a case adverse to a former client if it retains any relevant
confidential information from the former client, because the law firm
may never reveal such information or use such information (even if it
does not reveal it) about the former client.
27
C. The Hot Potato Doctrine
Lawyers are trained in the art of examining alternatives, of find-
ing loopholes. Accordingly, we should not be surprised that some law-
yers, who find it financially rewarding to take on a case against a
present client, would seek to avoid the ethical problem by the simple
expedient of making the present client a former client. Needless to
say, the ethics rules have responded to this ploy by what is called the
hot potato doctrine.
In Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc.,28 while disqualifying a law firm
involved in a simultaneous representation of conflicting interests, the
court cryptically noted, at the end of its opinion, that "the record
shows that after learning of the conflict which had developed, the [law
firm] offered to withdraw its representation of Cinerama in the [other
case] ."29 The law firm, in short, tried to "fire" the client, thus con-
Id. (emphasis added). Note that the ABA has not officially numbered the comments
to the Model Rules, although some courts, in adopting the Model Rules, have done so.
The numbering system here follows that used in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, 1997 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PRoFEsSIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY (1997).
24 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 4 (1995).
25 See id. Rule 1.6(a), (b).
26 Id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 22.
27 Id. Rule 1.9.
28 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
29 Id. at 1387.
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verting the present client to a former one. Cinerama did not accept
the law firm's efforts to go away, and so the law firm "continued, albeit
reluctantly, to have one foot in each camp."30 The court, without fur-
ther comment, appeared to accept the right of the client to refuse to
accept the law firm's efforts to withdraw from further representation
of the client complaining about the conflict. Thus the law firm had its
foot stuck in each camp, and the court therefore required the law
firm to be disqualified in the case where the law firm was acting ad-
versely to the client.
The Cinema 5 court did not bother to explain its reasoning, but its
conclusion is correct. The principle flows from the law of agency.
The lawyer is the agent of the client, and therefore is a fiduciary. A
fiduciary should not be able to profit from its breach of the fiduciary
obligation of loyalty. Subsequent cases have ruled, in general, that a
law firm may not drop a client like a hot potato simply in order to take
on another, more favored client.3 ' If a law firm has created a conflict,
it will not be allowed to automatically shift resolution of a conflicts
issue from ABA Model Rule 1.7 (dealing with current clients) to the
more lenient standard of ABA Model Rule 1.9 (dealing with former
clients) by the simple expedient of dropping one client in order to
take on a more favored one.
32
Stratagem understood the hot potato doctrine. It specifically
stated that a law firm "may not undertake to represent two potentially
adverse clients and then, when the potential conflict becomes actual,
pick and choose between them."3 3 However, the issue is not the hot
potato doctrine; rather, it is whether it should properly apply to the
facts of Stratagem. If the affiliated corporation is not a client, there
would be no hot potato to drop.
30 Id.
31 Several cases discuss the permutations and limitations of the hot potato doc-
trine. See, e.g., Gould Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D.
Ohio 1990); Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ohio
1987), affd, 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D.
264 (D. Del. 1980). See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, One Potato, Two Potato, Three
Potato, Four, 14 LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON, D.C., Aug. 12, 1991, at 23-24.
32 See, e.g., State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Op.
RI-139; AmSouth Bank v. Drummond Co., 589 So. 2d 715, 721-22 (Ala. 1991). In
AmSouth Bank, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a law firm should not "benefit
from a conflict that it has created," id. at 721, but the firm should not be disqualified
if it "did not by its own actions create the conflict of interests," id. at 722.





The operation of the rules dealing with disqualification of coun-
sel are magnified by the fact that the disqualifications imposed by
ABA Model Rule 1.7 (dealing with simultaneous representation) and
Model Rule 1.9 (dealing with subsequent representation) are auto-
matically imputed to all the other lawyers associated with a law firm.
3 4
A modem law firm may number hundreds of lawyers, located in vari-
ous cities stretching across the United States or the world. Each of
these lawyers, like Typhoid Mary, can infect the entire law firm with
her disqualifications.
Although the client may waive the benefits of this imputation
rule,3 5 it is often strategically advantageous not to do so. A party who
can disqualify the other party's attorney imposes additional costs on
the adversary, who must pay to reeducate a new lawyer. While the
ethics rules look with disdain on conflicts raised for strategic pur-
poses,36 the fact remains that the implications of such stratagems are
hard to ignore.
E. The Lack of Appealability of Conflicts Motions
and the Death of Precedent
Since 1981, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,37 the Supreme
Court has held that denials of motions to disqualify are not appealable
as final decisions in civil cases. Subsequent courts have expanded that
ruling so that neither the grant nor the denial of a motion to disqual-
ify, is now appealable as of right in either civil or criminal cases.3
8
Many state courts have followed the federal lead by rejecting the no-
tion of a right to appeal on this issue. The parties are left with the
34 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.10(a) (1995).
35 Id. Rule 1.10(c).
36 1d, Rule 1.7 cmt. 15 (1995); accord id. Rule 1.9 cmt. 13; see also Penwalt 85
F.R.D. at 264. In ruling against Plough, the court found "troubling" Scholl's refusal to
let the law firm withdraw in the antitrust case, in light of its request that the court in
that case delay its ruling. Id. at 274. It would be improper, said the court, to convert a
reasonable effort to enforce the Canons into a "litigation tactic." Id. Yet such tactics
are hardly foreign to modem day litigation. See Robert Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda,
Officers, Directors, and Their Professional Advisors, 3 CORP. L. REv. 82 (1980).
37 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
38 See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (no appeal of grant-
ing of a motion to disqualify in civil case); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259
(1984) (no appeal of granting of disqualification motion in criminal cases); United
States v. White, 743 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1984) (no appeal of denial of motion to dis-
qualify in criminal case).
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cumbersome and procedurally difficult remedy of filing an extraordi-
nary writ of mandamus.
3 9
The consequence of the dearth of appellate court rulings since
Risjord has led to what might be called the death of precedent in attor-
ney disqualification cases. In the pre-Risjord era, there were many dis-
qualification motions, and lower courts found themselves reversed
with some regularity. A body of law was developing, and-because the
Courts of Appeal were developing it-there were various bright lines
and clear tests emerging to guide the lower courts in disqualification
motions. A lower court that made up its own rules would be promptly
reversed. In the post-Risjord era, trial court judges have almost carte
blanche to disqualify or not to disqualify as they see fit. While the U.S.
Supreme Court is properly concerned about a conflict among the cir-
cuits, and will typically grant review to resolve such a conflict, a con-
flict among the district courts in attorney disqualification cases is now
standard operating procedure. Risjord and the cases in its wake have
not reduced the number of disqualification motions, but they have
reduced the uniformity in the way they are resolved.40
Consider Stratagem, which ruled that lawyers cannot be adverse to
affiliates of their corporate clients. The Stratagem court believed that
lawyers who represent trade associations cannot be adverse to mem-
bers of the trade association, even though these members are not the
clients of the law firm, have never been represented by the law firm,
and may never be represented by the law firm.
39 A few federal appellate courts have agreed to review lower court decisions us-
ing the extraordinary writ of mandamus. See In re Sandahl, 980 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir.
1992); In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1992).
40 See, e.g., SWS Fin. Fund A v. Salomon Bros., 790 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
The law firm had filed suit against the defendant for alleged violation of commodities
regulations and the antitrust laws. The defendant was a current client of the firm with
respect to issues of compliance with commodities trading regulations. In spite of this,
the court denied the defendant's motion to disqualify the firm. Judge B.B. Duff said
that he wanted to avoid creating an incentive for companies to give several law firms
small pieces of business so as to disqualify them later, although there was no evidence
that had happened in this case. Should big law firms be treated in such cases as if
they were defenseless victims? Note that the standard rule in such cases is to disqual-
ify the law firm. Indeed, the ethics rules of the Northern District of Illinois (which are
identical to the ABA Model Rules on this issue) prohibit a law firm from suing a con-
current client, even if the matters are unrelated. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr
FOR THE N. DIST. OF ILL. Rule 1.7 & cmt. (1996). But, the trial judge's ruling was not
appealable.
Judge Duff later came under severe criticism in connection with other rulings
and then resigned from the bench. See Mike Robinson, After Years of Erratic Behavior,
Federal Judge Steps Down in Chicago, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1996, at A21.
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Stratagem was decided in the Southern District of New York.
Nearly a decade before this opinion, the Second Circuit, which has
jurisdiction over the Southern District, rejected the Stratagem reason-
ing. The Second Circuit, in fact,' specifically stated that a "law firm
that represents the American Bar Association need not decline to rep-
resent a client injured by an automobile driven by a member of the
ABA.",41
But the trial court in Stratagem could get away with its dubious
interpretation of precedent in its own circuit because there was no
appeal as of right. What happened in Stratagem is not unusual. As I
read the many disqualification cases that are reported each year, I am
more and more struck by the increasing lack of uniformity, by the
number of judges who create new rules, new exceptions, and even
newer exceptions to the new exceptions-all in a context in which
there is unlikely to be any appellate decision to end the confusion and
conflicts in the trial level. This truly is the death of precedent, be-
cause any trial judge who is of the mind to do so can take whatever
position she wishes regarding the application of the conflict of inter-
est rules, confident that the chances of reversal are slim.
This development-the death of precedent-is significant, be-
cause it gives great prerogative and freedom to any judge faced with a
motion to disqualify a law firm, while law firms and their clients are
subjected to expensive litigation with no hope for appeal. Instead of
broad, unreviewable discretion, there is a need for brighter lines and
clearer tests so that firms know what to do. A rule that says that the
41 Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746, 749 (2d Cir. 1981). Stratagem,
oddly enough, cited the trial court in Glueck in support of its broad rule. See Strata-
gem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing
Glueck, 512 F. Supp. 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd on different grounds, 653 F.2d 746
(2d Cir. 1981)). The trial court's citation is a little misleading. It is true that the
district court in Glueck promulgated a broad rule, at the page number of Federal
Supplement that Stratagem cited. The Second Circuit, however, relied on a Seventh
Circuit decision in another case, and specifically did not rely on or adopt the trial
judge's reasoning. Glueck, 653 F.2d at 749. The Seventh Circuit decision relied on a
breach of a promise of confidentiality, not on any purported obligation to affiliates of
clients. The Second Circuit, relying on that case, used the "substantial relationship"
test and found that the law firm knew material and relevant confidences that would be
compromised if it were not disqualified. Glueck, 653 F.2d at 749-50.
Stratagem also relied on Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
which it described as a case where the law firm was disqualified because it represented
a closely held corporation in which plaintiff and defendant each held 50 percent of
the stock. In Rosman, the trial court found no relevant confidences, but it specifically
ruled that the disqualified law firm had actually entered into an attorney-client rela-
tionship with both Rosman and Shapiro. Id. at 1445. The Rosman trial court did not
use any broad parent-subsidiary theory.
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judge may, or may not, disqualify only after "sift[ing through] all the
facts and circumstances '42 gives little guidance to law firms and clients
who, understandably, would like to know what the rules are so that
they can obey them before a disqualification motion is ever filed. It is
all right to "weigh the interests" only if the courts first calibrate the
scales and inform us how the weight of the different interests is
determined.
Lawyers who are very ethical do not want to go near the line that
demarcates unethical behavior. Lawyers who are disqualified lose
their clients for that particular case, and-depending on the client's
reactions-perhaps in others as well. In addition, ethical lawyers are
reluctant to risk soiling their reputation with the adverse publicity of a
disqualification order. Thus, the vague test for a conflict rule and the
unreviewability of the courts' orders involving disqualification are two
factors that give a competitive advantage to the less ethical lawyer, the
more risk prone lawyer, the lawyer who is willing to play the lower
court lottery. Such lawyers care less about their reputation, and real-
ize that the risk of being disqualified is tempered by the reality that
the lawyer who turns down business because of possible disqualifica-
tion will lose the client for sure, but the lawyer who takes the case
might not be disqualified: vague rules mean that judges may not dis-
qualify when they should.
However, ethics rules should not be interpreted to give a compet-
itive advantage to lawyers who are willing to go to the edge of the line
(and occasionally cross it). Rather, ethics rules should promote a
world where law firms that are anxious to avoid conflicts of interest
should be at a competitive advantage to ethically challenged law firms
that are willing to approach, and occasionally cross, a vague ethics
line.
With this background, now let us turn to the main issue, the prob-
lem of sister corporations.
Ill. ETHICALLY PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Young children quickly learn that more is better than less. If ice
cream is good, more ice cream must be better. But parents, who are a
little more knowledgeable in such matters, know that more is better
than less only at zero cost. If more ice cream causes the children to be
sick, then more is not better than less.
So it is with ethics. Ethics is good, and we therefore might be
tempted to think that more ethics is better. Yes, but we are not talking
42 Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 269 (D. Del. 1980).
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about morality. We are talking about disqualification rules. Overly
strict or vague disqualification rules that impose unnecessary burdens
on clients wishing to select their own counsel are not better than
more carefully considered rules. The rules we impose on attorneys
have costs to clients, to society, and to lawyers; if the benefits are out-
weighed by the costs, we should reevaluate the rule. The basic ques-
tion is whether large corporations, with control over many other
corporate entities, should have the power to leverage their already
considerable economic power to limit their opponent's choice of
counsel.
Such is the case with a rule imposing disqualification of a lawyer
merely because he or she (or someone else in the same law firm) rep-
resents, in an unrelated matter, a corporation that is affiliated with an
adversary. I submit that Stratagem and those cases that follow it are
simply wrong. There should be no per se rule prohibiting a lawyer or
law firm from representing a client adverse to a corporation (let us
call it Corporation A2) simply because the lawyer or law firm repre-
sents, in an unrelated matter, a different client (let us call it Corpora-
tion A,) that is affiliated with Corporation A 2.
43
If the law firm learned material client confidences from Corpora-
tion A1 that are relevant in the case against Corporation A244 then, as
discussed above, the law firm is disqualified because of the need to
protect client confidences.45 But that is not the situation with which
we are dealing. Imposing disqualification on the law firm in the hy-
pothesized situation does nothing to protect the law firm's duty to
treat client information as confidential because, by hypothesis, there
are no relevant confidences to keep.
If Corporations A, and A2 were the same corporation, then the
normal ethics rules, as discussed above, would impose a per se disqual-
ification because there is a duty of loyalty to a present client. How-
ever, by hypothesis, there is not one corporation but two or more
corporations. The law firm has never represented Corporation A2,
does not purport to represent Corporation A2, and has no attorney-
client relationship with Corporation A2. Corporation A2 is repre-
sented by its own lawyer, whom it used to move to disqualify the op-
posing law firm.
43 There is an "affiliation" in the sense that Corporation A, is a parent, subsidiary,
wholly or partly owned by, or a sister corporation of Corporation A2.
44 Or, another way of saying the same thing, if the two matters are substantially
related. If the matters are the same matter or substantially related, the danger of a
breach of material confidences or secrets is real.
45 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, Corporation A2 would be surprised to learn that the law
firm it seeks to disqualify could be representing it or speaking for it.
The factual circumstances surrounding the association (or rather, the
lack of any association) between the law firm and Corporation A 2 have
no indicia of an attorney-client relationship. Imposing disqualifica-
tion on the law firm does nothing to protect the law firm's duty of
loyalty towards Corporation A 2, because the law firm has never repre-
sented Corporation A2, which has its own counsel. The law firm does
represent Corporation A, but Corporation A, is not a party to the
lawsuit; if a motion is made to disqualify the law firm, it will be made
by Corporation A 2, an adverse party. Or the motion might be made by
the parent (Corporation A3) of Corporation A 2.
The parent of this corporate family, of course, is not even a party
to the lawsuit. And (unless the corporate veil is pierced) the parent
will not be liable for any damages awarded. Further, if the subsidiary
of Corporation A3 collects any damages, the creditors of the subsidi-
ary, not Corporation A3, has the priority to collect those damages.
The subsidiary may be able to transfer some of the damage award to
Corporation A3, but that transfer of money will usually have tax conse-
quences. In short, for every purpose (except, apparently, for purposes
of the law of conflicts) the law treats parents, subsidiaries, and sister
corporations as separate and distinct legal entities.
If there ever were a dispute between Corporation A 2 and Corpo-
ration A, it would be clear that the law firm's loyalty lies only with
Corporation A, not Corporation A 2. Even if one corporation is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the other, the lawyer's duty is solely to Cor-
poration A, because the law recognizes two separate entities. For ex-
ample, transfers of assets from one corporation to another may be a
fraud on the creditors and the lawyer may not assist that fraud.
4 6
46 While there is little case law directly on point, the leading case on this issue
involves a dispute between unincorporated divisions of the same company. See Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In Exxon, the court
required a corporate division (wholly owned by a corporation) to have its own coun-
sel, whose loyalty would be to the division, not to the corporate owner. The court, in
short, required the lawyers to treat a wholly-owned subsidiary as a client separate and
distinct from the parent corporation.
In Exxon, a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) administrative proceeding involved
the "Drives Group," a "segment" of a wholly-owned subsidiary of Exxon. The Drives
Group was not a separate corporate entity. The FTC challenged Exxon's acquisition
of the Drives Group and sought its divestiture. The trial court prohibited Exxon's in-
house and retained counsel from having any attorney-client relationship with the
Drives Group.
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the Drives Group "has no independent cor-
porate existence." Id. at 1346. But it rejected Exxon's argument that there could be
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On the other hand, if the default rule of ethics is that a lawyer
who represents a corporation is automatically precluded from repre-
senting any other client who seeks a position that is adverse to the
bottom line of any corporate affiliate of the client, the impact of the
disqualification rule is significant. Such a default rule has serious
drawbacks. It restricts the right of lawyers to practice in circumstances
where the disqualified law firm has no access to any relevant confiden-
tial information and has never represented the adverse party who is
now moving to disqualify it. This rule-treating separate corporations
as one entity for conflict purposes-serves to limit the freedom of a
client to hire a lawyer of her choice.
A corporation does not normally have carte blanche power to
limit the right of a law firm to represent interests that are adverse to
third parties.47 The corporate client (which is affiliated with the ad-
no conflict between the Drives Group and Exxon even though the Drives Group was
now solely owned by Exxon. Id. at 1345. If the Drives Group became a separate corpo-
rate entity and if it were divested, then-said the D.C. Circuit-it would be a competi-
tor of Exxon. Id. at 1346. The court thus affirmed this portion of the lower court
order and did not reach the FTC's argument that it would be unethical for Exxon's
counsel to also represent the Drives Group. Id. at 1347 n.32; see also RESTATEMENT
(THmD) OF THE LAw GOvERNING LAwvEis § 212 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991).
47 The Model Rules reflect a reluctance to allow third parties or other lawyers the
power to restrict the right of a lawyer to practice law because such a restriction "limits
[the lawyers'] professional autonomy" and also "limits the freedom of clients to
choose a lawyer." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 5.6 cmt. 1 (1995).
For example, the Model Rules limit the ability of a law firm to restrict the right of its
members to practice law after termination of the relationship with the partnership
except when the restrictions are incident to provisions concerning retirement bene-
fits. Id. Rule 5.6(a).
The Model Rules also prohibit a lawyer from agreeing to restrict his or her right to
practice as part of a settlement of a controversy "between private parties." Id. Rule
5.6(b). Although the Model Rules explicitly refer to "private parties," an ABA Formal
Opinion-emphasizing the importance of the lawyer's freedom to practice-regards
that language as merely descriptive, not prescriptive. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 394 (1995). Thus, the Formal Opinion held that it
was unethical for a lawyer to agree to restrict her right to practice as part of a settle-
ment with a public agency, even though the agency is not a "private party" as de-
scribed in Model Rule 5.6(b).
As discussed above, clients and lawyers can always agree that the lawyer will not
(or will) represent other clients who are adversaries of an affiliate. That is not to say
that clients have carte blanche power to impose on their lawyers blanket restrictions
on their ability ever to represent a particular person or entity. For example, ABA
Model Rule 5.6(b) states that a lawyer may not offer or make an agreement in which a
restriction on a lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy
between parties. MODEL Rua.xs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 5.6 (1995). A xeno-
phobic client, for example, cannot require his lawyer never to represent foreigners. A
racist client cannot require its law firm never to represent blacks. In order for the
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verse party) is not a party to the lawsuit, and the law firm's client
(which is a party to the lawsuit) does not object to the law firm repre-
senting it. The affiliate of the corporate client (who is the adversary in
the lawsuit) is the only party in the lawsuit who objects.
It is not sufficient to retort that the lawyer can always secure con-
sent. First, consent from whom? At the time that the law firm initially
represents Corporation A1, that client (Corporation A1) is in no posi-
tion to waive the rights of Corporation A2. At the time that represen-
tation is begun, Corporation A2 may not even exist.
Second, when is this consent supposed to be secured? Consider
the original hypothetical, where a law firm that occasionally repre-
sents Taco Bell in real estate matters would like to sue KFC on behalf
of a tort plaintiff injured by a KFC delivery truck. At the time the
lawsuit is brought the corporate parent, for example, Pepsico (Corpo-
ration A 3) has no incentive to give consent. It is strategically useful to
deny consent because disqualification imposes increased costs on the
opposition. The opposing party has to find and educate new attor-
neys. The law should not be reluctant to impose such costs if the poli-
cies behind the ethics rules demand it. But those policies do not
demand it in most situations of conflicts involving corporate families.
At the time that the law firm begins its representation of Taco Bell
(Corporation A2), the law firm may not even know of the relationship
with KFC (Corporation A,), or that relationship may not yet exist.
In weighing the interests, it is also important to understand that
the corporate affiliate of the client and the rest of its corporate family
are not without remedies. We are dealing with corporate families.
That means that the clients are sophisticated: they are not only operat-
ing in the corporate form but they are operating within a corporate
family structure. Such clients are often represented by inside counsel
before they ever decide to hire any outside counsel. There are various
self-help methods that are reasonable for a sophisticated corporate
client to use to protect itself and to protect its affiliates.
For example, the corporate client, at the time of the initial en-
gagement letter, can always stipulate that, as a condition of represen-
tation, the law firm agrees to take no cases adverse to a list of affiliates
restriction on legal practice to be valid, it should reasonably relate to legitimate client
interests. An analogy may be made to choice of law rules. Two parties can agree by
contract to be bound by the laws of the jurisdiction of State A or State B, assuming
that the parties have reasonable contacts with eitherjurisdiction. But two parties have
no right to agree to be bound by the laws of State X (a jurisdiction with which neither
party has any connection), just because one of the parties likes the laws of State X.
EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.8 (1982).
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of the corporate client.48 The client knows better than the lawyer who
the affiliates are and how close the relationship with the affiliate must
be before the client demands that the lawyer not represent interests
adverse to these sister corporations. If the corporate client is later
purchased by another corporation or in some other way becomes part
of another corporate family, the corporate client will make that move
subject to its earlier waiver.
The corporate client, by emphasizing that it intends to ignore the
default rule proposed here, and that it wishes to impose a broad view
of disqualification upon the law firms that it hires, puts the lawyers on
notice that this particular retention is subject to major opportunity
costs. The law firm, in response, may wish to charge their fees accord-
ingly, because the retention imposes special opportunity costs on the
law firm. These opportunity costs are represented by the business lost
due to the law firm agreeing, by contract, to be bound by a broad
view of conflicts. Alternatively, if the corporate client says nothing in
its engagement letter, then it waives any right to preclude the law firm
from representing a party adverse to an affiliate of the client. If the
client says nothing, the default rule is simply that the client has no
right automatically to preclude the law firm from representing a party
adverse to an affiliate.49 The corporate client, in short, is simply asked
to tell the law firm, at the time of the initial retention, what it expects
the law firm to avoid as a conflict of interest. The law firm continues
48 Now that law firms and corporate clients are becoming more aware of the sis-
ter corporation issue, we should expect to see more of these engagement letters in
the future. In the meantime, courts must create a default rule when no engagement
letter details how the issue should be resolved. See Maureen Castellano, ABA Draws
Line on Corporate Conflict Rules, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON, D.C., Apr. 3, 1995, at 2
(referring to a law firm that, for approximately the last three years, has inserted a
provision in its standard engagement letters to corporate clients confirming that the
firm represents the parent company but has not been retained to represent and is not
representing any of the company's subsidiaries).
49 In other words, when the client hires the law firm, the client agrees to waive, in
futuro, any objections based on a breach of loyalty if the law firm later is adverse to an
affiliate of the client. However, the law firm is not asking the client to waive, infuturo,
any objections based on a breach of confidences. An ABA Formal Opinion notes that
"courts are very reluctant to conclude from a prospective waiver an agreement by the
client to waive rights of confidentiality." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 372, at 7 (1993).
To the extent that the corporate family is large and far-flung, and therefore more
likely to be concerned about the sister corporation problem, it is also more likely to
have its own house counsel who can advise it whether it should insist that the law firm
be loyal not only to the law firm's client but to corporate affiliates of the law firm's
client. It also should have greater leverage and bargaining power. The law firm can
also advise the client about the terms of the engagement letter.
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to be bound to hold inviolate the confidences of its corporate client,
and cannot represent anyone else where those confidences are rele-
vant. The law firm, in short, is always bound by its duty of confidenti-
ality, but is not automatically bound (unless the engagement says
otherwise) to treat-for purposes of the duty of loyalty-the corpo-
rate affiliate of a client as if that affiliate (a separate corporate entity)
were the client itself.
In addition, whether or not there is an engagement letter, if a
corporate client later determines that it wishes to impose a broad no-
tion of disqualification, if it is offended that the law firm is represent-
ing another client in a matter adverse to the interests of the affiliate of
the corporate client, and if the law firm does not agree to be bound by
the restrictions, the offended client can always end its retention and
terminate the lawyer. While the lawyer cannot merely walk away from
the client without reason,50 the client can always fire the lawyer for
any reason or no reason.51 These self-help, market-oriented mecha-
nisms lessen the need for a per se default rule that always favors
disqualification.
The ABA Formal Opinion, Conflicts of Interest in the Corporate Fam-
ily Contex52 is the major effort of the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility to deal with the question of
conflicts of interest involving affiliates of corporate clients. The Com-
mittee debated the question for two years before issuing its Opinion.53
The resulting effort signaled a deeply divided committee, with four of
the ten members filing sharply worded opinions that dissented in
whole or in part.54
The majority clearly rejected any per se rule requiring disqualifi-
cation, thus joining similar ethics opinions on the state level. 55 How-
50 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1995).
51 The lawyer-client relationship is not an agency coupled with an interest.
52 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 390 (1995).
53 Castellano, supra note 48, at 2.
54 Deborah A. Coleman filed an opinion concurring and dissenting; Richard L.
Amster and Lawrence J. Fox each filed dissenting opinions; and Kim Taylor-Thomp-
son concurred in the dissents of Messrs. Amster and Fox. The majority opinion was
the product of the Committee and did not indicate an author, though the primary
author was David Isbell. Castellano, supra note 48, at 2.
55 See, e.g., N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 684 (1991)
(opining that a law firm that represents a parent corporation may also represent a
party with interests adverse to a subsidiary of the parent corporation in an unrelated
matter if: (1) the law firm does not have access to relevant confidential information
adverse to the subsidiary; (2) there is no attorney-client relationship between the law
firm and the subsidiary; and (3) the parent corporation's interests are not materially
affected by actions against its subsidiary).
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ever, it volunteered that "the circumstances of a particular
representation may be such that the corporate client has a reasonable
expectation that the affiliates will be treated as clients, either generally
or for purposes of avoiding conflicts, and the lawyer is aware of the
expectation."
56
The Committee's opinion reflects problems that may be inherent
in any product of a committee dealing with a controversial issue:
vagueness, ambivalence, inconclusiveness, and ambiguity. This uncer-
tainty imposes transaction costs on any disqualification, because we
may not know, until we have extensive litigation, whether the lawyer
should be disqualified. Ambiguity results in a perverse effect, giving a
competitive advantage to law firms that are willing to push to see how
close they can get to the vague line. More careful firms, wishing to
avoid even a chance that they may be found to have engaged in an
unethical representation, are forced to disqualify themselves from
these cases. The law should not favor the less careful firms unless
California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility also
promulgated a Formal Opinion holding that a law firm may undertake representation
adverse to a wholly-owned subsidiary of the law firm's corporate client if the parent
corporation is not the "alter ego" of the subsidiary and the subsidiary has not revealed
confidential information to the law firm with the expectation that it would not be
used adversely to the subsidiary. This Opinion also states: "The percentage of owner-
ship of stock, while a factor to consider, is by no means itself determinative." Cal. Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 1989-113 (1990).
The Maryland Bar Association's Committee on Ethics concluded that the lawyer
for the subsidiary of a publicly traded corporation could ethically handle a suit against
another subsidiary of the same company. Md. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Formal
Op. 19 (1987).
56 'ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 390, at 3 (1995).
Prior to the quotation in the text, the Committee stated:
It is the Committee's opinion that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
do not prohibit a lawyer from representing a party adverse to a particular
corporation merely because the lawyer (or another lawyer in the same firm)
represents, in an unrelated matter, another corporation that owns the po-
tentially adverse corporation, or is owned by it, or is, together with the ad-
verse corporation, owned by a third entity. The fact of corporate affiliation,
without more, does not make all of a corporate client's affiliates into clients
as well.
Id. The Committee also states that if the affiliate is only partially owned by the parent,
that is "a variable that may affect the result in a particular case." Id. at 3 n.2 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
But the Committee majority may appear to be ambivalent and irresolute, be-
cause, right after making the statement quoted in the text, it then announced that
"the Committee believes that as a general matter, in the absence of a clear under-
standing otherwise, the better course is for a lawyer to obtain the corporate client's
consent before the lawyer undertakes a representation adverse to its affiliate." Id. at 3.
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there is a good reason why the line drawing must be vague. In this
case, as we shall we, we can draw brighter lines.
The ABA Formal Opinion tells us that, in determining if a lawyer
represents a corporate affiliate of a client, there is no "clear-cut per se
rule," but rather one must look at "the particular circumstance. '57 In
looking at a particular circumstance, we are first told that the lawyer
must not simply consider the terms of the engagement letter. The
engagement letter is the basic contract with the client. One would
think that a clear engagement letter should end the matter. If the
corporate client has waived any argument that the law firm must be
loyal to any affiliates of the corporate client, that term of the engage-
ment letter should govern.
In any event, the ABA Formal Opinion advises that we must also
consider "whether the circumstances are such that the affiliate [of the
client] has reason to believe, on the basis of the nature of the lawyer's
dealings with it, that it has a client-lawyer relation with the lawyer."
58
If the affiliate of the corporate client believes that it has a client-lawyer
relationship with the lawyer, then the majority appears to find a
conflict.
On the other hand, if the lawyer passes this hurdle, that is, if the
affiliate of the corporate client is not the lawyer's client, then the affili-
ate may still argue that the lawyer's representation of one client in a
lawsuit against the affiliate of another client is adverse because of the
"potential economic impact on the affiliate entails an impact on the
corporation itself."5 9 In response to this argument, the Committee
declared that this economic impact is "indirect," not direct: "Although
there is room for dispute on the point, we believe the better view is
that the adverseness in such circumstances is indirect, and not
direct."60
The classification that the Ethics Committee insisted on is signifi-
cant. If the adverseness is "direct," then, under Rule 1.7(a) of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), both clients must con-
sent to the representation. Thus, if our hypothetical law firm repre-
sents a client in a tort claim against KFC, and this adverseness to Taco
Bell (the real client of the law firm, and also a corporate affiliate of
KFC) is direct, then Taco Bell would have the right to veto that repre-
sentation, because Taco Bell and KFC are both subsidiaries of Pepsico.
However, if the adverseness is "indirect," as the Committee insisted,
57 Id.
58 Id. at 8.
59 Id. at 11.
60 Id. at 12.
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then Model Rule 1.7(b) applies, and, in the hypothetical I have
presented, the law firm suing KFC need secure consent only from the
tort plaintiff, not from Taco Bell or KFC. The law firm can take the
case if the tort plaintiff consents and the lawyer reasonably believes
that the representation will not be adversely affected.
6'
Unfortunately, although the Model Rules have an extensive "Ter-
minology" section placed just before Rule 1.1, the section supplies no
definition and offers no litmus test to define these crucial terms, "indi-
rect" and "direct." The Committee held that the adverseness is "indi-
rect" because the "immediate impact" of the lawsuit is on the affiliate
and is "only derivatively upon the client. '6 2 This distinction appears
metaphysical, a definition pretending to be a syllogism.
63
The dissent criticized the majority as pontificating, substituting a
pronouncement for reasoning. If the client of the affiliate writes the
settlement check, does that make the adverseness "direct," because
then there is an immediate impact? The Committee did not consider
such questions but, amazingly, claimed that "the phrasing of Rule
1.7(a)," which uses the "direct" language, "is not ambiguous,"" and
the difference between "direct" and "indirect" is a "bright line striking
a balance between the interests of lawyer and client."65
I am reminded of the cartoon inventions of Rube Goldberg, who
drew wildly complex contraptions that accomplished trivial ends. A
typical Rube Goldberg device to shell an egg is tripped when one
picks up the morning paper from the kitchen table, which causes a
string to be pulled to open the door of a bird cage, releasing a bird
that follows a trail of birdseed to a platform. The bird then falls off the
platform into a pitcher of water, which splashes on a flower, causing it
to grow, thereby pushing up a rod that causes a pistol to fire. A mon-
key scared by the pistol shot hits his head against a bumper attached
to a razor that cuts into the egg, loosening the shell, which falls into a
saucer. The inventions that Rube Goldberg designed worked every
time.66 Was the inevitable effect direct or indirect? If the relation
61 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a), (b) (1995).
62 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 390, at 13 (1995).
63 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 cmt. d, at 549
(Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1996) (announcing that the test in corporate family
situations is whether there is a "direct, adverse impact on the client"); see also id., illus.
6 & 7.
64 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 390, at 13 (1995).
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., RUBE GOLDBERG, RUBE GOLDBERG V. THE MACHINE AGE; A RETROSPEC-
TIVE OF HIS WORK WITH MEMOIRS AND ANNOTATIONS (1968).
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between the cause and effect is convoluted but inevitable, and the
time period is quick, does that make it direct?
6 7
In determining whether the affiliate of the corporate client is also
a client, and whether any adverseness is "direct" or "indirect," another
important provision to consider is Model Rule 1.13. This Rule gov-
erns cases where an organization (such as a corporation, a trade asso-
ciation, a union, or a partnership) is a client. Rule 1.13 imposes no
per se rule that treats the affiliates of an entity as the client of a lawyer
who represents the entity. Rather, to the extent that there is a per se
rule, it is to the contrary: the client is the corporate entity, not the
affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of the entity. Thus, Model Rule 1.13(a)
provides: "A lawyer employed or retained by an organization repre-
sents the organization acting through its duly authorized constitu-
ents." These constituents, such as "[o]fficers, directors, employees
and shareholders,"68 the Comment emphasizes, "are [not] the clients
of the lawyer. '6
9
The lawyer, in short, represents the entity, not its constituents,
such as shareholders. The case where one corporation is the subsidi-
ary of one or more other corporations is merely a situation where the
shareholder of the corporation happens to be another corporation.
But the client is the entity; the client is not the shareholders, even if
the shareholders are corporations. Thus, Comment 8 warns that "the
organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or
more of its constituents." 70 In such cases, the lawyer should advise the
constituent that "the lawyer cannot represent such constituent ....
The lawyer, however, can continue to represent the corporation. Rule
1.13 objects to the notion that a law firm is in a per se conflict when-
67 At another point the Committee said that "directness" relates to the "closeness
of the connection between the lawyer's actions and the adverse effect on the client."
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 390 (1995).
68 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. 2 (1995). The origins
of Rule 1.13(a) lie in Ethical Consideration 5-18 of the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (as amended through 1981), which provided that
[a] lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee,
representative, or other person connected with the entity. In advising the
entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his professional
judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires of any person or
organization.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1981) (citations omitted).
69 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. 3 (1995).




ever it advances a position that is adverse to a constituent element (a
corporate affiliate) of one of its clients.
To preclude the law firm from representing a client (e.g., Client
Alpha) adverse to Corporation A 2 merely because the law firm also
represents Corporation A1 in an unrelated matter serves to deprive
Client Alpha of its choice of its own counsel. The law sometimes does
that, but it does not do so in such a cavalier manner. The reason must
be sufficiently weighty. The reason in this case cannot be to protect
the confidential information of Corporation A1 (because we have as-
sumed that the law firm knows no relevant confidential information),
nor is the reason to protect the law firm's loyalty towards Corporation
A. The law firm, after all, is not suing Corporation A. It is adverse to
Corporation A2, and that corporation is merely the shareholder of
Corporation A,. So what is the reason to treat the affiliate of a client
as the client itself?
The dissents filed to ABA Formal Opinion 390 thought that they
had the reason. The dissenters argued that it is sophistry to think of
Corporations A, and A2 as separate entities, because affiliated corpora-
tions have a financial relationship with each other.72 Corporate "fami-
lies are financially totally inter-dependent,"73 and the "location of a
corporate family's losses are totally irrelevant to the impact on the
bottom line."74 The distinction between different parts of the same
corporation and different corporations in a corporate family "exalts
form over substance."75
Granted, whatever happens financially to a corporation in the
corporate family will affect the bottom line, but that cannot be the test
for determining who is the lawyer's client and to whom the lawyer
owes a duty of loyalty.76 Let us assume what should be a clear case of
72 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 390 (1995) (Rich-
ard L. Amster and Lawrence J. Fox, dissenting).
73 Id. at 20 (Lawrence J. Fox, dissenting).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 17 (Richard L. Amster, dissenting); see also id. at 21 (Lawrence J. Fox,
dissenting).
76 Cf. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979). The general coun-
sel for the state teachers' union represented three male physical education teachers
in a suit alleging that maintenance of separate seniority lists for male and female
physical education teachers was illegal. Female teachers, who were also members of
the same union, would be disadvantaged if the men prevailed. Thus they moved to
disqualify the men's union counsel. Because of the union, the female teachers were
paying, in part, for their opponent's legal expenses. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit,
holding that there should be no disqualification, reversed the trial court. There was
no danger that the union counsel had any unfair advantage because he had not
gained any relevant, material, confidential information from the female teachers due
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financial interdependence: Corporation A1 (the parent) agrees to pay
the legal bills of the counsel for Corporation A2. That arrangement is
similar to the typical insurance relationship, where the insurer pays
the legal fees of the lawyer for the insured. A corporation (or private
individual) buys an insurance policy that obligates the insurer to pay
the damage award, if any, and also to pay the costs of defense.
What happens to the insured affects the bottom line of the insur-
ance corporation. Although the insurance corporation pays the law-
yer's fees, the lawyer's ethical obligation is to the insured, not to the
insurer. The insurer merely pays the bills of the lawyer. The insurer is
also obligated to pay any judgment to the plaintiff, up to the policy
limits. If the suit is for less than the policy limits (not an unlikely
occurrence), the insurer is in a position that is financially similar to
the parent of a wholly-owned subsidiary. Every penny of the lawsuit
affects the bottom line of the insurer. Yet, these financial obligations
confer on the insurer no right to control the professional judgment of
the lawyer for the insured.77 Even though the insurance company's
to his position as union counsel. Nor was there any evidence that the lawyer's duty of
loyalty to the male clients would be diminished. Id. at 1247.
77 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(0 (1995); see, e.g., RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 68-69 (4th ed. 1995); Robert E. O'Malley,
Ethics Principles for the Insurer, the Insured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal Triangle Re-
formed, 66 TUL. L. REV. 511 (1991).
The American Law Institute's proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers concurs. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 215 cmt. f
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). Comment fstates that " It]he lawyer represents
the insured" even though the "lawyer might be designated by an insurer to represent
the insured under a liability insurance policy in which the insurer undertakes to in-
demnify the insured and to provide a defense." Id. Even if the insurance contract
states that the lawyer represents the insurer, the comment explicitly warns: "The in-
surer is not, simply by the fact that it designates the lawyer, a client of the lawyer." Id.
When there are differences or conflicts between the interests of the insurer and
insured (for example, when there is a question whether the claim is within the cover-
age of the policy, or when there is a claim in excess of policy limits), the lawyer's duty
of loyalty is not to the insurer. Comment f is quite specific:
[A] lawyer designated to defend the insured may not reveal adverse confi-
dential client information of the insured to the insurer... without explicit
consent of the insured. That follows whether or not the lawyer also repre-
sents the insurer as co-client and whether or not the insured has asserted a
"reservation of rights" with respect to its defense of the insured.




payment of legal fees "affects the bottom line"78 of the insurer, the
basic rule is that the lawyer represents the insured, not the insurer.
79
There is no logical reason why members of corporate families
should be treated as one client, while the insurer and the insured are
recognized as two separate clients. Moreover, the separate legal exist-
ence of corporations is something that the law continually recognizes.
The reasons why corporations create corporate families (parent, sub-
sidiaries, and sister corporations) is because the law confers various
substantive benefits on corporate entities that are created and treated
as separate entities.80 It is not a matter of form devoid of substance.
Those who take advantage of the benefits of multiple incorpora-
tions should also assume the burdens. Corporations, like other per-
sons, have to accept the bitter along with the sweet. Why should large
corporations be able to use their economic power as leverage to dis-
qualify lawyers by creating corporate families? They should not be
able to have it both ways, by conducting business through a series of
corporate entities, perhaps with a complex, ever-changing and bewil-
dering organizational chart, using an impenetrable fog of subsidiaries
and affiliates when it appears advantageous to do so, and then argue
(when someone else relies on the legal and economic separateness of
these entities) that none of this really matters, that the corporate fam-
ily really is a single entity for one purpose only-for the purpose of
applying the conflicts of interest rules in a way that prevents a client
from choosing a lawyer who also happens to represent a corporation
affiliated with this far flung corporate empire. 8 '
It is interesting that the dissenters in ABA Formal Opinion 95-390
have no dispute with earlier ABA Formal Opinions that apply the en-
78 Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
79 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 149 N.E.2d 482 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958); Employ-
ers Casualty Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1973); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAw GOvERNING LAWvyERs § 215 cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); id. § 215
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991) (Reporter's Note to Comment c).
80 See supra note 37.
81 One should realize that the law firm may not know, and may have no reason-
able means of knowing, who all the members of a corporate family are since they are
constantly changing over the years. See Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co.,
738 F. Supp. 1121, 1125-26 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85
F.R.D. 264, 266 (D. Del. 1980). ABA Formal Opinion 95-390 recognizes this problem
and opines that a "lawyer who has no reason to know that his potential adversary is an
affiliate of his client will not necessarily violate Rule 1.7 by accepting the new repre-
sentation without his client's consent." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 390 (1995).
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tity theory to partnerships and trade associations.8 2 Yet partners, in
either a limited or general partnership, also have financial relation-
ships with each other, just like affiliated corporations have financial
relationships with each other. Nonetheless, the normal rule for ethi-
cal purposes is that the lawyer for a partnership represents the part-
nership as an entity, whether or not the partnership is treated as an
entity or an aggregate under state law.88 If there is a lawsuit between a
partner and the partnership, each side has its own lawyer.
It should be obvious that a lawyer for the partnership does not
automatically represent all of the partners of that partnership. 84 If the
law were otherwise, then a partnership could never be represented by
counsel if it were in a dispute with one or more of its partners, be-
cause the lawyer who represented the partnership would be deemed
to also represent the adversary (the partner with whom the partner-
ship had its dispute), and therefore be involved in a conflict.
Similarly, a trade association is treated as an entity, with the law-
yer representing that entity and not the constituent members of the
entity, even though the trade association would not exist but for the
financial contribution and membership of its individual members.8 5
The dissent in ABA Formal Opinion 95-390 had no trouble treating a
partnership or a trade association as an entity, even if state law treats
these organizations as an aggregate. Yet the dissent objects to treating
82 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 361 (1991) (dis-
cussing the representation of a partnership); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 365 (1992) (discussing trade associations as clients).
83 See, e.g., Kapelus v. State Bar, 745 P.2d 917 (Cal. 1987); Responsible Citizens v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 764 (Ct. App. 1993); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 & cmt. 2 (1995) (discussing the organization as client);
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. Rule 3-600 & Discussion
(1996); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 361 (1991) (dis-
cussing the representation of a partnership).
84 The circumstances would be different if the lawyer for the partnership prom-
ised or lead one or more of the individual partners to believe that the lawyer was
representing their interests. See Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580
F.2d 1311, 1319-21 (7th Cir. 1978). In Westinghouse, the law firm for a trade associa-
tion promised its individual members that it would treat information from them as
protected by the attorney-client privilege, and then on the strength of that promise
did obtain confidential information that was material to a substantially related case
that the law firm brought against several members of the trade association. The court
ruled that the law firm should be disqualified in order to protect these confidences.
Id.
85 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 365 (1992) (dis-
cussing trade associations as clients).
[VCOL- 72:3
CORPORATE FAMILY CONFLICTS
a corporation as an entity, even though state law says that it is an
entity.8
6
Those who argue that we must not treat the subsidiaries or par-
ents or sisters of a corporation as separate entities are really arguing
that-only for purposes of the rules of ethics and of disqualification-
we must always pierce the corporate veil. The question is why? Why
automatically pierce the corporate veil in ethics cases but not in other
situations?
In corporate law, courts may pierce the corporate veil but they do
not do so casually. Corporate law normally treats each corporation as
a separate, incorporeal entity, and thus various rules determine when
the rare circumstances exist that allow courts to pierce the corporate
veil, thereby circumventing a fundamental legal principle of corpo-
rate law. Courts may disregard the corporate entity only in certain
cases, when necessary to avoid misuse of the law of incorporation,
such as when a subsidiary is undercapitalized.
8 7
For example, in United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc.,88 the Fifth
Circuit pierced the corporate veil and found that the parent was the
alter ego of the subsidiary: all of the directors and officers of the two
corporations were identical; the parent paid many of the subsidiary's
obligations; the parent made substantial loans to the subsidiary with-
out interest charges or collateral requirements; the corporations filed
consolidated financial statements and tax returns; the subsidiary uti-
lized the parent's equipment and offices without compensating the
parent; and the subsidiary's employees' salaries were paid by the par-
ent. These facts constituted the touchstone. There is no automatic
piercing simply because one corporation is wholly owned by another.
In ethics, as in corporate law, if one is to pierce the corporate veil
for purposes of deciding a disqualification issue, one should deter-
mine those circumstances in which public policy demands piercing. A
86 Mr. Fox, dissenting, makes the point that the distinction between partnerships
and trade associations, on the one hand, and affiliated corporations, on the other, is
that "we are talking about a wholly-owned corporate family. The only analogies that
would be apt here are a single partner partnership or a single member trade associa-
tion." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 390 (1995). How-
ever, even when one corporation wholly owns another, the law treats them as separate
entities with separate (and sometimes adverse) obligations.
87 See Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. General Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1981); St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pepsico, Inc., 884 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989); Lucas v.
Texas Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1984) (holding that though parent company
was not held liable, the court might pierce the corporate veil and hold the parent
liable if the subsidiary was not reasonably capitalized in light of the nature and risk of
its business).
88 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985).
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similar analysis should apply to disqualification issues. ABA Model
Rule 1.7 invites such an analysis because it is divided into two parts.
Rule 1.7(a) applies a strict rule of disqualification if the lawyer repre-
sents one client "directly adverse to another client." Only in such
cases is there a per se disqualification unless the lawyer can secure the
consent of both clients.8 9 Even consent from both clients will normally
not cure a situation in which the lawyer represents a client in one case
while suing that client in another case. 90
The lawyer in our basic hypothetical is not prohibited by ABA
Model Rule 1.7(a) from taking a tort case against KFC (which is not a
client) simply because she has engaged in title work for Taco Bell
(even when KFC and Taco Bell are both owned by Pepsi). Our hypo-
thetical lawyer, in taking the tort action against KFC, is taking no posi-
tion adverse to Taco Bell.
Model Rule 1.7(b), however, is also applicable. If the attorney's
representation of the plaintiff against KFG might be compromised, or,
in the words of that rule, "materially limited" by her obligations to
Taco Bell, then there is a conflict that requires disqualification unless
first, the tort plaintiff consents,91 and second, the lawyer reasonably
determines that her representation will not be "adversely affected."
92
In other words, not all conflicts can be cured by consent. Even if the
tort plaintiff consented, if a reasonable lawyer would conclude that
her representation would be adversely affected by her obligations to
Taco Bell, then she cannot take the case.
Nor should the lawyer take the case if she really treats KFC or
Pepsi as her client, even though Taco Bell is the nominal client. In
ascertaining whether a wholly-owned (or substantially-owned) corpo-
rate subsidiary should be considered the same entity as the parent, the
lawyer should evaluate the separateness of the entities involved, estab-
lish whether corporate formalities are observed, determine the extent
to which each entity has distinct and independent management and
boards of directors. Only after considering these factors should a law-
yer conclude whether, for legal purposes, one entity should be consid-
ered the alter ego of the other.
93
For example, one situation where-for purposes of the rules of
ethics-it may be appropriate to pierce the corporate veil occurs
89 MODEL Rut-Es OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUC" Rule 1.7(a) (2) (1995).
90 Id. Rule 1.7 & cmt. 3.
91 Id. Rule 1.7(b)(2).
92 Id. Rule 1.7(b)(1).
93 See Teradyne, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C-91-0344-MHP-ENE, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8363, at *7 (N.D. Cal.June 6, 1991) (referring to the State Bar of Califor-
nia's Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 113 (1989)).
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when the parent corporation has an integrated legal department with
similar personnel. If the two affiliated corporations do not have sepa-
rate legal departments, and the same people act for both in retaining
and actively supervising the outside lawyer, that is an important factor
to consider in determining if it would be appropriate to treat the two
corporations as one for ethical purposes. 94 Just as observing corpo-
rate formalities is important in corporate law, so too in applying the
law of ethics.
Consider Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc.,95 where the court noted
that a conflict involving the affiliated corporations would develop be-
cause the two sister corporations were being reorganized so that they
would be in the same division, with the Chief Executive Officer of that
division sitting on both boards of directors. The legal departments
were also being consolidated so that there would be one legal depart-
ment under the active supervision of the same attorney.96 Though the
court refused to disqualify for other reasons (the alleged conflict had
been thrust upon the law firm by the merger activities of the corpora-
tion now seeking to disqualify the law firm),97 the existence of similar
personnel is relevant. In other words, it may be difficult for a lawyer
to visit with the general counsel of the parent corporation in the
morning to discuss the settlement tactics in a case where the law firm
is defending the subsidiary of the parent corporation (who share the
same legal department), and then (later that afternoon) for the law-
yer to meet with the same general counsel, pound on the table, and
threaten punitive damages while discussing settlement in a case where
the law firm is on the opposite side, suing a different subsidiary of the
same parent corporation, all of whom are represented by the same
general counsel.
Another situation involves the case where the failure to disqualify
the law firm would interfere with or taint the results of the litigation.
Consider Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co.98 In that case, the
94 See Teradyne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8363, at *7. The court disqualified the law
firm, looked carefully at the facts, and was impressed that counsel for the subsidiary
was hired and supervised by the legal department of the parent corporation. But see
Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Sprint Publ'g & Adver., Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2363 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 1996). In a very thoughtful opinion, Judge Wayne Andersen
refused to disqualify a law firm in a corporate family situation. There was one general
counsel for two subsidiaries, however, this particular individual did not personally
retain the law firm that he now sought to disqualify and was not actively managing the
litigation in question.
95 85 F.R.D. 264 (D. Del. 1980).
96 See id. at 272.
97 Id.
98 738 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
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law firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, representing plaintiff Gould,
sued various defendants, including Pechiney, alleging unfair competi-
tion. Pechiney moved to disqualify Jones, Day because the firm also
represented (in unrelated patent matters) IG Technologies, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Pechiney. The court noted that 'Jones, Day has
made no effort to obtain the consent of Gould or Pechiney, nor did it
ever attempt to notify them of this conflict of interest."99 But the
court still refused disqualification as a remedy, reasoning:
First, there has been no demonstration that Pechiney has been
prejudiced in any way by Jones, Day's representation of Gould.
Confidential Pechiney information has not passed to Gould as a re-
sult ofJones, Day's representation of IGT, which is unrelated to the
instant case. Second, disqualifying Jones, Day from representing
Gould would not only cost Gould a great deal of time and money, in
retaining new counsel, it would significantly delay the progress of
this case.... Finally, the conflict was created by Pechiney's acquisi-
tion of IGT several years after the instant case was commenced, not
by any affirmative act of Jones, Day. In short, the integrity of the judi-
cial process in this case has not been threatened by the conflict.10 0
This test, whether the alleged conflict has threatened "the integ-
rity of the judicial process," appears to be a strict one, suggesting that
there should be very few parent-subsidiary cases where disqualification
is an appropriate remedy. An example where the integrity of the judi-
cial process would be threatened is the situation where the lawyer,
while representing Corporation A, learns client secrets that would be
relevant in the case against Corporation A2. In that case, the represen-
tation would taint the judicial process because the lawyer learned rele-
vant confidences that could be used to her advantage without the
consent of Corporation A1.10 1
Another situation that must be considered occurs when the law-
yer suing the corporation affiliated with a corporate client is asking
for declaratory or injunctive relief that would impose restrictions on
the corporate client itself. In such a case the court should, for ethical
purposes, pierce the corporate veil and impose disqualification. For
example, in Hilton v. Barnett Banks, Inc.10 2 the law firm for Hilton sued
Barnett Banks while representing a subsidiary of Barnett Banks.
Hilton's law firm did not name its client-affiliate as a party, but it did
99 Id. at 1126.
100 Id. at 1126-27 (emphasis added).
101 See Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.
1978).




ask for injunctive relief against "all affiliates" of Barnett Banks.
Hence, the court treated the affiliate as a de facto party and disquali-
fied the law firm. The affiliated client was not (or soon would not be)
a mere bystander to this particular lawsuit.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the sister corporation issue is an important one, only
recently have law firms and clients begun to appreciate its signifi-
cance. The new ABA Formal Opinion will serve to highlight this issue
and may lead to a revision in the ethics rules as lawyers and clients
search for more definite guidelines.103
Florida and Washington, D.C. are thus far the only jurisdictions
to deal with this issue explicitly in their Rules of Professional Conduct.
Florida provides that there is no per se disqualification and, like this
article, it attempts to offer relatively concrete guidelines for both law-
yers and clients.104 Washington, D.C. recently adopted new comments
to its Rule 1.7 that are considerably more elaborate and comprehen-
sive than Florida's efforts. These comments, like the Florida rule, also
reject per se disqualification. 10 5
There should not be a per se rule that assumes-for purposes of
conflicts of interest-that the corporate veil should always be pierced.
The lack of a per se disqualification rule does not mean that a corpo-
103 See Apex Oil Co. v. Wickland Oil Co., No. CIV-S-94-1499-DFL-GGH, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6398, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1995) (rejecting the reasoning in ABA
Formal Opinion 95-390 in favor of a more specific and narrow approach, and holding
that a parent and subsidiary would be considered the same for purposes of the con-
flict of interest rules only if the two entities were true alter egos).
104 The comment to Rule 4-1.13 provides:
Consistent with the principle expressed in subdivision (a) of this rule, an
attorney or law firm who represents or has represented a corporation (or
other organization) ordinarily is not presumed to also represent, solely by
virtue of representing or having represented the client, an organization
(such as a corporate parent or subsidiary) that is affiliated with the client.
There are exceptions to this general proposition, such as, for example, when
an affiliate actually is the alter ego of the organizational client or when the
client has revealed confidential information to an attorney with the reason-
able expectation that the information would not be used adversely to the
client's affiliate(s). Absent such an exception, an attorney or law firm is not
ethically precluded from undertaking representation adverse to affiliates of
an existing or former client.
FLA. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.13 cmt. (1996).
105 See Appendix, infra. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted new
Comments 13 through 18 to Rule 1.7, entitled "Organization Clients." These com-
ments were pending for well over a year and were finally adopted and went into effect
on November 1, 1996.
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rate family would be unable to impose such a rule. The law firm and
client, in the initial engagement letter, could always agree to treat
some or all members of the corporate family as a single entity, or as
separate entities. In light of the problems this article has discussed,
lawyers and clients should try to foresee and solve these problems
before they occur. If a law firm's decision to represent a particular
corporation means that it must forgo the opportunity to represent a
whole host of other clients, the law firm should know that it is making
a decision that will impose heavy opportunity costs. Clients, as well,
should think through whether it is worthwhile to impose this opportu-
nity cost on the law firm.
Whether or not there is such an agreement, a law firm should not
undertake a representation adverse to a corporation that is affiliated
with a corporate client of the law firm if the adverse matter is the same
as, or substantially related to, the matter on which the lawyer repre-
sents the client entity. The reason for this restriction is that clients
can decide to waive, in advance, the lawyer's duty of loyalty, but courts
will look with suspicion on a waiver, in advance, of the lawyer's duty to
preserve confidences. 106 If the adverse matter is the same or substan-
tially related to the matter on which the law firm presently represents
the client entity, or if the law firm has learned confidences from the
corporate client that are relevant to the case brought against the affili-
ate of the corporate client, the obligation to preserve the confi-
dences10 7 owed to the corporate client precludes the representation.
In the absence of an agreement governing the corporate affiliate
issue, the law firm should not be adverse to the corporate affiliate of a
client if the affiliate is the alter ego of the corporate entity. As dis-
cussed above, this alter ego theory has various permutations. If there
really is an alter ego, if it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil for
the purposes of ethics, then the law firm should also refuse to under-
take the representation. Of course, one should not expect that a cor-
poration will lightly claim that it is the alter ego of another, separately
incorporated entity. If one corporation were the alter ego of another,
the price of winning the disqualification motion may be high, because
106 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 372 (1993)
(discussing waivers of future conflicts of interest). The opinion states that "courts are
very reluctant to conclude from a prospective waiver an agreement by the client to
waive rights of confidentiality." Id.
107 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995).
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the corporation risks assuming the contingent liabilities of its alter
ego. 108
If consent of the corporate client or the affiliate of the corporate
client is unnecessary, or has been secured in the original engagement
letter, the law firm should still secure the knowledgeable consent of
the client it is representing adversely to the corporate affiliate. As
ABA Formal Opinion 95-390 points out, even if there is no need for
consent from the corporate client (because any adverseness is "indi-
rect"), and there is no need for consent from the corporation affili-
ated with that client (because the affiliate is not a client), there still is
a need to secure consent from the party that the law firm is represent-
ing against the affiliated corporation. In the case of the tort plaintiff
against KFC, the law firm may not need the consent of KFC, Taco Bell,
or Pepsico, but the law firm must secure the knowledgeable consent
of the tort plaintiff.109 The law firm must also satisfy itself that it will
not be adversely affected."10
Stricter rules than those outlined in this article will impose costs
on both lawyers and clients. These costs are not needed to protect the
legitimate expectations of corporate families. Vaguer rules will also
impose costs, and these costs serve to penalize the ethical lawyers who
attempt to steer clear of ethical problems.
APPENDIX
District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
Comment: Organization Clients1"'
[13] As is provided in Rule 1.13, the lawyer who represents a cor-
poration, partnership, trade association or other organization-type cli-
ent is deemed to represent that specific entity, and not its
shareholders, owners, partners, members or "other constituents."
Thus, for purposes of interpreting this Rule, the specific entity repre-
108 See HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER Busi-
NESS ENTERPRISES § 148 (2d ed. 1970); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETsou, BusINEss
ASSOCIATIONS § 3.05 [E] (3d ed. 1996).
109 See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)(2) (1995).
110 See id. Rule 1.7(b)(1).
111 D.C. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1996) (citations
omitted).
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sented by the lawyer is the "client." Ordinarily that client's affiliates
(parents and subsidiaries), other stockholders and owners, partners,
members, etc., are not considered to be clients of the lawyer. Gener-
ally, the lawyer for a corporation is not prohibited by legal ethics prin-
ciples from representing the corporation in a matter in which the
corporation's stockholders or other constituents are adverse to the
corporation. A fortiori, and consistent with the principle reflected in
Rule 1.13, the lawyer for an organization normally should not be pre-
cluded from representing an unrelated client whose interests are ad-
verse to the interests of an affiliate (e.g., parent or subsidiary),
stockholders and owners, partners, members, etc., of that organiza-
tion in a matter that is separate from and not substantially related to
the matter on which the lawyer represents the organization.
[14] However, there may be cases in which a lawyer is deemed to
represent a constituent of an organization client. Such de facto repre-
sentation has been found where a lawyer has received confidences
from a constituent during the course of representing an organization
client in circumstances in which the constituent reasonably believed
that the lawyer was acting as the constituent's lawyer as well as the
lawyer for the organization client. In general, representation may be
implied where on the facts there is a reasonable belief by the constitu-
ent that there is individual as well as collective representation. The
propriety of representation adverse to an affiliate or constituent of the
organization client, therefore, must first be tested by determining
whether a constituent is in fact a client of the lawyer. If it is, represen-
tation adverse to the constituent requires compliance with Rule 1.7.
The propriety of representation must also be tested by reference to
the lawyer's obligation under Rule 1.6 to preserve confidences and
secrets and to the obligations imposed by paragraphs (b) (2) through
(b) (4) of this Rule. Thus, absent consent under Rule 1.7(c), such
adverse representation ordinarily would be improper if-
(a) the adverse matter is the same as, or substantially related
to, the matter on which the lawyer represents the organization
client,
(b) during the course of representation of the organization
client the lawyer has in fact acquired confidences or secrets (as
defined in Rule 1.6(b)) of the organization client or an affiliate
or constituent that could be used to the disadvantage of any of
the organization client or its affiliate or constituents, or
(c) such representation seeks a result that is likely to have a




[15] In addition, the propriety of representation adverse to
an affiliate or constituent of the organization client must be
tested by attempting to determine whether the adverse party is in
substance the "alter ego" of the organization client. The alter
ego case is one in which there is likely to be a reasonable expecta-
tion by the constituents or affiliates of an organization that each
has an individual as well as a collective client-lawyer relationship
with the lawyer, a likelihood that a result adverse to the constitu-
ent would also be adverse to the existing organization client, and
a risk that both the new and the old representation would be so
adversely affected that the conflict would not be "consentable."
Although the alter ego criterion necessarily involves some impre-
cision, it may be usefully applied in a parent-subsidiary context,
for example, by analyzing the following relevant factors: whether
(i) the parent directly or indirectly owns all or substantially all of
the voting stock of the subsidiary, (ii) the two companies have
common directors, officers, office premises, or business activities,
or (iii) a single legal department retains, supervises and pays
outside lawyers for both the parent and the subsidiary. If all or
most of those factors are present, for conflict of interest purposes
those two entities normally would be considered alter egos of one
another and the lawyer for one of them should refrain from en-
gaging in representation adverse to the other, even on a matter
where clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the preceding paragraph [14]
are not applicable. Similarly, if the organization client is a corpo-
ration that is wholly owned by a single individual, in most cases
for purposes of applying this Rule, that client should be deemed
to be the alter ego of its sole stockholder. Therefore, the corpo-
ration's lawyer should refrain from engaging in representation
adverse to the sole stockholder, even on a matter where clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of the preceding paragraph [14] are not
applicable.
[16] If representation otherwise appropriate under the pre-
ceding paragraphs seeks a result that is likely ultimately to have a
material adverse effect on the financial condition of the organiza-
tion client, such representation is prohibited by Rule 1.7(b) (3).
If the likely adverse effect on the financial condition of the organ-
ization client is not material, such representation is not prohib-
ited by Rule 1.7(b) (3). Obviously, however, a lawyer should
exercise restraint and sensitivity in determining whether to un-
dertake such representation in a case of that type, particularly if
the organization client does not realistically have the option to
discharge the lawyer as counsel to the organization client.
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[17] The provisions of paragraphs [13] through [16] are
subject to any contrary agreement or other understanding be-
tween the client and the lawyer. In particular, the client has the
right by means of the original engagement letter or otherwise to
restrict the lawyer from engaging in representations otherwise
permissible under the foregoing guidelines. If the lawyer agrees
to such restrictions in order to obtain or keep the client's busi-
ness, any such agreement between client and lawyer will take pre-
cedence over these guidelines. Conversely, an organization
client, in order to obtain the lawyer's services, may in the original
engagement letter or otherwise give consent to the lawyer in ad-
vance to engage in representations adverse to an affiliate, owner
of other constituent of the client not otherwise permissible under
the foregoing guidelines so long as the requirements of Rule
1.7(c) can be met.
[18] In any event, in all cases referred to above, the lawyer
must carefully consider whether Rule 1.7(b) (2) or Rule 1.7(b) (4)
requires consent from the second client whom the lawyer pro-
poses to represent adverse to an affiliate, owner or other constitu-
ent of the first client.
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